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Research continued on the conceptual design of an onboard computer 
software system for enhancing the safety of commercial airline flights. Work 
was performed in four areas.
The first area was that of flight crew member interviews. A brief trip 
was made to Purdue University to observe crew members being trained on a 
simulator for a 707. The purpose of this trip was to prepare us for the visit 
to the United Airlines Training Center in Denver. The results of our 
observations and discussions with crew members at Denver were again 
encouraging. It was pointed out to us that automatic procedure monitoring, 
and automatic checklisting would be of help during abnormal flight conditions. 
In addition, it was pointed out that automatic procedure monitoring would be 
useful during normal flight conditions, particularly during the adjustment 
period after changes in operational procedures have been made by airline 
policymakers.
The second area was that of instrument verification. The Instrument 
Verification System was augmented to allow the utilization of second order 
effects to verify instruments which measure rates of change of various 
parameters. As a result, the rate of fuel consumption can be verified against 
the fuel flow instruments and the rate of change of altitude can be verified 
against the rate of climb instrument.
The third area was that of script based monitoring. A set of scripts was 
implemented to describe a complete flight. The Script Based Monitor then 
follows through the scripts and monitors the progress of the aircraft. When 
deviations from the script are detected, it informs the pilot. Several other
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scripts were implemented to describe alternate procedures for recovering from 
single engine failures before and after VI.
The fourth area was that of the aircraft simulator. Several new features 
were added to improve the interface with the experimenter. Several 
pre-programmed scenarios were created to allow the instrument verification and 
monitoring capabilities to be demonstrated.
On July 13, 1978 the status of this project was demonstrated to members 
of the FAA and the DOT in Washington, D. C.
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2. VISIT TO UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT TRAINING CENTER
During this quarter, two field trips were made to better acquaint the 
project personnel with actual airline cockpit procedures. The first was a 
half day visit to the Boeing 707 flight simulation facility at Purdue 
University in preparation for the second trip, to United Airlines Flight 
Training Center in Denver. The Purdue trip, made in a University of Illinois 
Piper Lance, flown by the two pilot-advisors for the project, also illustrated 
the operation of a typical light airplane in IFR operations.
A visit was made to the United Airlines Flight Training Center in Denver 
on July 5, 1978. The day began with a briefing with Captain Dale Cavanagh, 
head of their flight training operations. Dr. Chien gave a brief overview of 
our project and all discussed some of its concepts and goals. Capt. Cavanagh 
then explained their program and what we would be observing for the day. He 
explained that all United flight crew members begin their training at the 
facility there in Denver. They start with self paced audio-visual courses 
covering the fundamentals such as aerodynamics, powerplants, and meteorology. 
As each lesson is completed, a test is taken before continuing. These tests 
are administered and graded via terminals connected to the PLATO computer 
system. The next training phase pertains to the particular aircraft to be 
flown and would be also used whenever a crew member changes seats or 
airplanes. It consists of morning classroom sessions on the particular 
aircraft's procedures and systems, with afternoons spent in the cockpit 
procedure trainer. The classroom lectures are also based on audio-visual 
presentations, but an instructor is present to guide and answer questions. 
The material is also available in a library for additional out of class study. 
The CPT (Cockpit Procedure Trainer) is a mockup of the actual airplane, and
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although it does not simulate flight, the switches and indicators function 
like the actual systems. Thus afternoons are spent drilling on checklists and 
procedures, both normal and emergency.
After about two weeks of this phase, the crew begins work in a fully 
equipped simulator. The simulators have a complete functioning cockpit, an 
instructor's console, a limited motion system, and a visual display. The 
display consists of either a set of computer generated lights representing a 
night landing or a video image from a camera which follows a terrain map. 
Certain of the simulators are so realistic that the FAA has certified them for 
landing experience. This phase provides approximately 12 to 14 hours of hands 
on experience plus an equal amount of time acting in other flight crew 
capacities, and covers all phases of flight. Then only the captains receive a 
two hour flight in a real airplane before all are FAA checked during an actual 
flight.
Once a year thereafter, all flight crew members participate in a half day 
proficiency check as required by FAA Part 121. These are held in the flight 
simulators and cover a set of required procedures under the supervision of a 
check pilot. Six months later, and on a yearly basis, the crew members are 
scheduled for proficiency training. This session is less structured than the 
above checks with emphasis on emergencies and unusual situations that may be 
encountered. Since actual emergencies and equipment failures are so rare in 
actual flight, this training is often the crew's only real chance to exercise 
the special procedures originally taught during earlier training. It also 
gives the instructors an opportunity to demonstrate conditions which have led 
to true inflight emergencies, thus hopefully avoiding future repeated
incidents.
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Oar group was split into three pairs due to space limitations within the 
simulators. One pair first toured the facility visiting the audio-visual and 
training classrooms, the libraries, the CPTs, the terrain map used in some of 
the displays, and inspected the various simulators including those of the 727, 
the DC8, and the larger DC10 and 747.
After lunch we were introduced to Capt. Lloyd Tomak and check pilot Walt 
Bally, and observed about two hours of their proficiency training. It 
included normal takeoff and landings, stalls, steep turns, and many simulated 
malfunctions. Some of these were a total hydraulic system failure 
necessitating a no flaps, no brakes landing, and many lesser subsystem 
failures such as circuit breakers popping and faulty indicators. In one case, 
the flap indicator showed that the inboard flaps had not deployed, and a 
partial hydraulic system failure was assumed. After following the recommended 
procedure for backup extension, the inboard flaps still indicated up. Since 
the backup procedure was unsuccessful, the crew resumed the flight according 
to procedures for limited flap operations. The instructor intervened to ask 
whether the flaps had indeed not extended, or whether the indicator had 
failed. When the crew did not know, he pointed out that the slats indicated 
proper extension and were on the same system as the inboard flaps. Thus the 
flaps had extended properly and it was the indicator that had failed, and no 
special flap operation was necessary. This demonstrated a case where an 
intelligent instrument verification system such as proposed by SECURE would 
have identified the problem readily and eliminated the improper conclusion.
The second pair first observed a morning proficiency check in a 727 
simulator with Capt. Jim Morrison conducted by check pilot Jim Shaffer. The 
flight began as a low visibility daytime flight from Chicago to Denver, then
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was interrupted to practice stalls. While following further clearances, 
emergencies such as a generator failure and an engine flameout were simulated. 
Other situations practiced were low visibility approaches, missed approaches, 
unexpected autopilot shutoff, and an engine failure at rotation. The 
procedures for solving these problems are found in the manual in the form of a 
flowchart. Particularly for multiple failures, the chart becomes difficult to 
follow and incomplete when most crucial. Most accidents happen from a chain 
of events, where an intelligent computer aiding the pilot could provide better 
and more timely nonstandard procedure checklists and help sort out multiple 
failures. During the afternoon, a proficiency training session was observed 
which simulated a flameout, smoke in the cockpit, decompression, a flap 
malfunction, and other lesser difficulties.
The third pair observed a DC8 morning session with Capt. Bob Dooley and 
check pilot Donald King. This flight also began routinely with a normal 
takeoff after all checklists were satisfied. This crew then practiced 
entering a stall situation, observing the stick-shaker, and recovering 
properly. They continued with a number of instrument approaches to minimums 
followed by a missed approach. Typical emergencies encountered were an engine 
fire, an engine flameout, and an electrical bus failure causing a temporary 
blackout. These were usually handled by the first and second officers while 
the captain continued to fly. Our observers again noticed the difficulties in 
using the emergency checklists, particularly in finding the appropriate one 
for a multiple failure. This afternoon session was similar to the others with 
many simulated failures including a decompression and a double engine failure.
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About mid-afternoon, the group reassembled for a discussion with Capt. 
Cavanagh, Capt. Shaffer, Brian Drissel (Program Development Manager), and 
others. One of the topics was the problems associated with cockpit warning 
devices. A number of different visual, aural, and tactile warnings can occur 
and may be caused by different malfunctions depending on the flight regime. 
Due to the complexity of the warning signals, some confusion usually occurs 
and in fact, the credibility of the signal is sometimes questioned. 
Furthermore, the time and degree of warning needs more evaluation, because 
whenever a loud continuous horn sounded, all three crew member's top priority 
seemed to be to disable the noise.
Other projects within the industry aimed at helping in the cockpit were 
then mentioned. These included (with reference):
1. A failure display system developed for BOAC; Capt. John Wilson 
(British Aerospace Corp.)
2. An automatic emergency checklist system developed by Garrett Air 
Research, found to be a luxury which could not be economically 
justified; George Jansen (Douglass Aircraft).
3. Lockheed C5 currently has 3 CRTs showing status of 800 systems.
Also a recent study by Boeing showing that a more sophisticated 
electronic pilot aid system was not cost effective.
The time spent observing was most interesting and pertinent to our work, 
and resulted in a better understanding of the cockpit environment during 
encountered difficulties and in a better understanding of the types of 
failures and warnings that exist. The particular excess and overlap of 
warnings in present use, and the problems in sorting out failures, 
demonstrated further the need for an intelligent cockpit monitoring system. 
In addition, any future cockpit aids will have to be cost effective while 
showing a significant increase in the safety and reliability of the aircraft.
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3. THE INSTRUMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM
Daring this quarter, work continued on the conceptual design of the 
Instrument Verification System (IVS). Techniques were developed to implement 
second order effects to be used to establish the consistency between various 
instruments. Specifically, the TVS was augmented to allow the comparison of 
fuel flow rates with the rate of change of the fuel level, and to allow the 
comparison of the rate of climb with the rate of change of altitude. In 
implimenting these verification schemes, several factors had to be considered 
in determining the time interval for sampling the instruments involved.
First, to compute the derivative of certain parameters numerically, the 
IVS needs data at two different instances in time. If the two instances are 
close enough, the variations of the observed parameter can be assumed linear 
so that ideally the computation of the rate of change of that parameter 
closely approximates the time derivative of that parameter at the midpoint of 
the interval. However, the accuracy of the computation of the derivative of a 
parameter is dependent on the accuracy of the instrument measurement of that 
parameter and on the roundoff error in both subtraction and division of the 
computer. Furthermore, in determining the consistency between related 
instruments, since the results of computations on the outputs of two or more 
instruments must be compared, it is important that the tolerance ranges be 
kept small relative to the values computed in order to make reliable 
comparisons. This means that if the measurement interval is too short, 
grossly erroneous results may occur in the computed derivative.
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Secondly, abrupt changes in the computed parameter must be dealt with. 
It is important that the IVS establish the consistency of the instruments as 
quickly as possible in these circumstances. These abrupt changes can arise 
from several sources. For instance, the aircraft could be changing state, as 
when it changes pitch to begin a rapid climb or descent. A system or an 
instrument could have failed. Or a momentary aberration could have occurred 
such as a power surge. Such an aberration should not affect the determination 
of consistency among the instruments, however, repeated occurrences of such 
transients may indicate the imminent failure of a system or the existence of a 
"flaky" instrument.
When the aircraft changes state, the rapid change of a measured parameter 
may yield a derivative value which is temporarily inconsistent with the
instrument being verified. In this case the decision of whether the
\
instrument is consistent with the rate of change of the second instrument 
should be deferred until either the transient has dissipated or it is apparent 
that there is a permanent inconsistency.
From these considerations it is apparent that, on the one hand, the IVS 
should have a longer observation interval to improve the sensitivity and the 
accuracy of the differentiation result. On the other hand, the TVS should 
have a shorter observation period to shorten the response time and the 
transient period. Tradeoffs among these factors should result in a proper 
observation interval for a given parameter.
In the implementation of these features into the IVS, two key concepts, 
the Event Queue and the Virtual Instrument, are introduced. The Event Queue 
implements the use of past status of parameters. It keeps a record of all the 
events, together with their context, to be initiated in the future. These
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events are ordered by their maturation time as they enter the queue. Such 
mechanisms have been used in controlling the repeating rate of the consistency 
check processes so that the computing resources can be properly distributed to 
various monitoring tasks.
To compute the time derivative of a given parameter by this mechanism, a 
pre-differentiation process, when activated, creates a post-differentiation 
process and places it into the Event Queue to be initiated after a proper 
observation interval. The pre-differentation process passes to the 
post-differentiation process the current values of the parameter and the 
current time. The post-differentiation process, when initiated, will compute 
the rate-of-change of the parameter during the observation interval. This is 
shown in Figure 1 where a pre-differentiation process is initiated every t
O
seconds and the derivative is computed t^ seconds later.
The communication between the differentiation processes and the 
consistency check processes, is accomplished by an asynchronous scheme by 
concept called the Virtual Instrument. At the first request to use the 
differentiation information of a given parameter, the TVS will automatically 
create a "soft" instrument with an unique name. The supporting mechanism for 
this virtual instrument is the differentation process, repeating itself 
indefinitely, and updating the reading of the virtual instrument constantly. 
In this manner, the differentiation process is isolated from the application 
processes so that the IVS does not have the burden of synchronizing the 
differentiating processes and their application processes. As shown in Figure 
1 the IVS requests a consistency check every t seconds and needs only to 















tc : Consistensy check period
ts : Predifferentiation period
t^s Observation period
Figure 1. The event queue sequence.
The control structure for the TVS is shown in Figure 2. As part of the 
initialization process of the SECURE system the communication link to the 
simulator is initialized and the event queue is zeroed. Then in an infinite 
loop the instruments are first read from the simulator data base and the 
events are executed one at a time and then removed. Included in the events to 
be executed are commands to verify each of the instruments.
Figure 1. Control Sequence for the IVS.
13
4. THE SCRIPT BASED MONITOR
During this quarter, the first operational version of the script-based 
monitor was completed. The script-based monitor has a library of twenty-four 
scripts that cover a complete flight from the preflight calculations to the 
landing roll. Twenty of these scripts describe a complete flight, one script 
describes recovery procedures for single engine failures occurring before the 
critical takeoff speed, VI, and three scripts describe recovery procedures for 
single engine failures after VI.
The script-based monitor was designed to operate on a hypothetical 
commercial three engine jet aircraft. The aircraft is simulated by a computer 
program that provides realistic aerodynamic, engine system, and navigational 
models of the aircraft. The flight procedure we chose is that recommended by 
McDonald Douglass and United Airlines for the DC-10. Hence, the aircraft 
simulator is tuned to the performance of a typical DC-10. This simulator 
generally performs close to the DC-10, but the few performance differences 
necessarily force different flight procedures.
4.1. The Aircraft Flight Profile
The scripts presently do not describe the horizontal motion of the 
aircraft. The aircraft motion is presumed to be locked in a vertical plane 
between the origin and destination runways. Thus the script-based monitor is 
aware of the correct vertical flight profile only. The script-based monitor 
is presently able to track the changing contexts, and with the normal 
condition specification of the present script, it is able to detect and to 
notify the pilot of abnormal states of airspeed, rate of climb, altitude, gear
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deployments, control surface deployments, throttle settings, and so forth.
The vertical flight profile coded into the script is diagrammed in Figure 
3. The normal flight profile starts at the beginning of the runway with the 
flaps and slats properly deployed and the engines partially spooled up. Upon 
receiving the clearance for takeoff, the throttles are pushed to 100%. When
the rotational speed, VR, is obtained, the aircraft is pitched up to climb at
a speed of ten knots above the climb speed, V2+10 knots. The gears are
retracted on confirmation of positive rate of climb. At 1,000 ft, the
aircraft is pitched down slightly to climb at roughly 1,500 ft/min. The flaps 
and slats are retracted at their respective retraction speed of V2+flap and 
V2+45 knots. At 1,500 ft, the throttles are reduced to climb power, and the 
aircraft is pitched to climb at roughly 1,000 ft/min. At 10,000 ft. the
throttles are further reduced and the plane is pitched to climb at a rate of
500 ft/min and to accelerate to 300 kias. The altimeter is set to 29.92 when
18,000 ft. is reached. When the cruising altitude of 31,000 ft is reached,
the throttles are pulled back to cruise power, and the aircraft accelerates to 
340 kias.
Climb Rate~1000ft/m in.








Figure 3b. Normal flight profile (cont.). 
Start descent
-Descent Rate ~ 1500ft/min.




Figure 3d. Normal flight profile (cont.).
Maintain 
Glide Slope
Figure 3e. Normal flight profile (cont.).
17
When approaching the destination, the throttles are pulled back, and the 
aircraft is pitched such that the aircraft descends at roughly 1,500 ft./min 
and 340 kias. Passing through 18,000 ft, the altimeter is reset to the local 
setting. At 10,000 ft, the aircraft is decelerated to 250 kias. At 5,000 ft, 
the aircraft is further decelerated to 200 kias. Preliminary flap and slat 
deployment may take place at this point. At 3,000 ft, the aircraft will hold 
the altitude until capturing the glide slope. After capturing the glide 
slope, the flaps and slats are advanced to 50%, and the airspeed is further 
decreased to 170 kt. The gears are lowered, and the flaps and slats are 
advanced to 100%. The throttles are pushed forward until the final approach 
speed of 160 kt is stabilized. At 50 ft, the throttles are pulled back and 
the flare initiated. Upon contact with the runway, the spoilers are 
activated, the brakes are applied, and the reversers are engaged. When the 
airspeed has decreased to 60 kt, the reversers are disengaged.
Climb at 210 kt.
Figure 4. Engine failure after flight profile.
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The single engine failure before VI script is essentially the landing 
roll of the normal flight scripts. The single engine failure after VI flight 
profile is shown in Figure 4. If the engine fails before attaining 1,000 ft, 
the throttle of the failed engine is pulled back to idle, the aircraft is 
pitched to climb at V2, and the gears are raised on positive rate of climb. 
At 1,000 ft, the aircraft is pitched level, and the flaps and slats are 
retracted at their normal retraction speeds. When both the flaps and slats 
are retracted, the throttles for the two good engines are set to climb power, 
and the aircraft climbs to 3,000 ft at 210 kt. Should the engine fail after 
attaining 1,000 ft, the throttle of the failed engine is pulled back to idle, 
the aircraft is pitched level, the flaps and slats are retracted on normal 
schedule, and the aircraft is on climb power and climbs to 3,000 ft at 210 kt.
4.2. Implementation of the Flight Scripts
The monitor is presently able to perform the preflight calculation of 
determining VI, VR, V2, takeoff power setting, and climb power setting. An 
associative relational data base of the relevant tables in the United Airline 
DC-10 Flight Procedure Manual is implemented. The monitor is told of the 
relevant parameters such as the aircraft weight, runway elevation, and runway 
temperature. Pattern matching techniques are then used to retrieve the 
critical takeoff parameters, and these parameters are then loaded into the 
scripts.
The script body defined in the last quarter has been divided into several 
segments in consideration of efficiency. In the following definitions, 
parentheses and capitalized symbols are terminal symbols. The script's main 
body is defined as follows:
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<entry condition> (OR [ <predicate> ! <entry condition> ]+ )
::= ( AND [ <predicate> ! <entry condition> ]+)
::= <predicate>
<ancestor> ::= ( SCRIPT-NAME )
<successor scripts> ::= ( [ NONE ! SCRIPT-NAME+ ] )
<descendants> ::= ( [ NONE I SCRIPT-NAME+ ] )
<normal conditions> ::= ( <predicate>* )
<predicate> ::= ( PREDICATE-NAME PREDICATE-STATE )
( PREDICATE-NAME LOWER-BOUND UPPER-BOUND )
In addition to the their main bodies, each script has a threshold value, 
a list of entry procedures, and a list of exit procedures. The threshold 
value is used to eliminate undesirable transient errors. The entry procedures 
are executed upon entry into the script in order to set up the proper 
environment. The exit procedures are executed on leaving of the script in 
order to clean up the residual effect of this script on the system. The entry 
and exit procedures of each script can modify the script body, or add and 
delete procedures from the "joblist."
The joblist is a list of jobs. Each job is a procedure associated with a 
predicate and an identification tag. When the joblist is evaluated, a 
procedure is executed if its associated predicate is true. After the 
execution of the job's procedure, the job is automatically deleted. The 
identification tag for each job facilitates the identification and deletion of 
the job from the joblist.
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The joblist is formally defined below:
JOBLIST ::= ( <job>*)
<job> ::= ( <job id> <job predicate> <job procedure> )
<job id> ::= ( JOB-NAME SCRIPT-NAME )
<job predicate> ::= <predicate>
::= (OR <job predicated )
::= ( AND <job predicated )
<job procedure> ::= a LISP procedure.
Each execution cycle consists of a test for script transition, a check 
for the present script's normal states, and an evaluation of the joblist. On 
script transition, the old script's exit procedures and the new script's entry 
procedures are executed. The entry procedures, exit procedures, and jobs are 
all capable of modifying scripts and the joblist.
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5. THE AIRCRAFT SIMULATOR
During this quarter, improvements were made to the three-engined jet 
aircraft simulation program. The main function of the simulator thus far is 
to maintain the aircraft's position, speed and attitude via a simple 
aerodynamic model and to simulate the various engine parameters. The aircraft 
systems which are currently being simulated are summarized below:
1. Flight
controls - aileron, elevator, flaps, speed brake
attitude - pitch, bank
speed - air speed, rate of climb
altitude - radio altimeter, barometric altimeter
2. Navigation
inertial nav. - latitude, longitude, heading 
radio nav. - VOR, DME, ADF
3. Engine
thrust
fuel - fuel flow, fuel quantity 








Faults are introduced into the simulator by breaking the update path to 
certain variables in the simulator. These variables will remain at their 
current value unless changed by the action of the experimenter. For example, 
a flameout of the number one engine is introduced by failing the variable 
VTHRUST1 and then setting VTHRUST1 to zero. Similarly, the failure of the 
barometric altimeter would be accomplished by failing the sensor variable 
SBARALT and then setting SBARALT to an erroneous value.
Two ADF systems have been added to the navigation systems. The 
aerodynamic model has been modified and wheel brakes have been added so that 
the simulator may reasonably portray the aircraft on the ground.
The engine parameters, EGT, EPR, N1 and N2 are now being simulated. 
These parameters are computed as linear functions of the throttle setting. In 
addition a time constant is introduced to simulate the delay as the engines 
spool up and down.
A new display has been added to the simulator. The simulator displays on 
a Vistar-II compatible terminal all the aircraft sensors currently being 
simulated. The sensors are clearly labeled and blocked out into five major 
groups: controls, flight instruments, navigation instruments, engine 
instruments and miscellaneous sensors.
Work has been completed on the interface between the simulator and the 
rest of the SECURE system programs. The sensor values maintained by the 
simulator are available in a sensor vector which may be passed to other 
programs via the IPCF facility of the PDP-10 operating system. To read the 
sensors, a program sends the simulator a message requesting all or part of the 
sensor vector. The simulator then composes a reply containing the requested
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information.
Three new commands have been added to the simulator which significantly 
improve the simulator's interface with the experimenter. The commands allow 
the use of command files to step the simulator through pre-programmed flight 
scenarios. The abort command allows the experimenter to abort a command file 
before its normal termination. The type command allows the experimenter to 
imbed comments into command files. These comments are displayed when the file 
is executed and aid the experimenter in following the scenario. The wait 
command allows the experimenter to control the processing of his command file 
based on various conditions within the simulator.
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6. FUTURE PLANS
During the final quarter of this contracting period, the major emphasis 
will be on the conceptual design of a system which is capable of generating 
plans for dignosing faults, for producing procedures to correct various faults 
and for producing alternate scripts which allow degraded modes of operation 
and general changes in the original script of the flight. In addition, this 
design will include the capability of generating plans for correcting trends 
leading to imminent failures or other types of difficulties.
The system will be designed to operate in a problem solving environment 
and will be heavily dependent on the knowledge base. The knowledge base will 
contain imformation about each of the aircraft systems and will be structured 
to reflect both the qualitative and the quantitative functioning of these 
systems.
Some of the questions we shall be concerned with are:
1. How can a hierarchical structure be imposed on the knowledge 
base in order to allow the system to "reason" about consequences 
of states of the aircraft and changes in the state of the 
aircraft?
2. Are there ways to distinguish between pilot "blunders" and 
malfunctions of aircraft systems?
3. What kind of problem solving environment best reflects the 
situations likely to occur on commercial aircraft and will allow 
effective planning of recovery procedures?
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QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE
The total expenditure during the period May 3, 1978 to 
August 3, 1978 was $32,170.
The $18,810 of remaining contract funds will be expended
during the fourth quarter.
